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The Social Democracy in action: Rosa Luxemburg addresses a crowd in 1907 |
Marx was, however,
always distasteful of grandly positive, uncritical declarations
about “the forward march of labour” (sour Hegelian that he was!).
In fact, one of Marx’s greatest polemics – in which we find him
at his most utopian – was occasioned not by a meditation on capital
itself, but by the need to put down some ungrateful socialist
upstart. The so-called Gotha Programme of the German Worker’s Party
(a statement that might otherwise have drifted into the same
obscurity as so many other amateur, utopian political decrees) was
tackled thus:
In a higher phase
of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the
individual to the division of labor, and therewith also the
antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after
labor has become not only a means of life but life's prime want;
after the productive forces have also increased with the all-around
development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative
wealth flow more abundantly -- only then can the narrow horizon of
bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on
its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to
his needs!2
The passage merits quoting at length
not only for what it says about the character of Marx (i.e. he was
frankly misanthropic when it came to dealing with the company of
socialist others), but also because it hints at a deep confusion
within Marxist thinking itself. At times Marx could argue
vociferously against any form of so-called “class compromise” –
that is, getting on with political life under capitalism to the
detriment of the revolution. While at others he takes the minimal
level of political freedom that stems (apparently naturally) from
capitalism as the space necessary for revolutionary organization to
take place. What, in practice, amounts to compromise and mere
reformism, on the one hand, and anticipatory revolutionary
organization, on the other?
Nevertheless, German Social Democracy
did mount a fairly convincing answer to this question. The
movement’s greatest intellectual, Rosa Luxemburg, phrased it like
this:
Viewing the
situation from the current standpoint of our party, we say that as a
result of its trade union and parliamentary struggles, the
proletariat becomes convinced, of the impossibility of accomplishing
a fundamental social change through such activity and arrives at the
understanding that the conquest of power is unavoidable.3
Reform, then, is
like a lubricant, smoothing the passage of the proletariat towards
revolutionary enlightenment. This uneasy synthesis was, however, too
easily undone. This, in part, because the broad ‘Marxism’ of the
movement had always concealed a myriad of conflicting political
motives. Marx had been initially critical of the perceived
abandonment of internationalism by the German socialist movement, a
fact he was proved depressingly right about when the First World War
eventually rolled round. The SDP, by then a shadow of its former
self, dropped its internationalist, pacifist pretensions, and sided
with the Kaiser. Luxembourg’s response was the formation of the
Spartacus League with Karl Liebknecht. Looking to Russia, in 1917,
she wrote: “A year of revolution has therefore given the
Russian proletariat that ‘training’ that thirty years of
parliamentary and trade union struggle cannot artificially give to
the German people.”4
Majority support was not necessary to legitimize revolutionary
action – in fact, popular legitimacy had disabled the
“bred-in-the-bone disciples of parliamentary cretinism” of German
Social Democracy. Instead it was vital that a vanguard Party seize
the initiative during a revolutionary struggle. As such the October
seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in 1917 was not only the saviour
of the flailing Russian revolution (ebbing and flowing since 1905)
but the “salvation of the honour of international socialism.”5
While Trotsky advocated “permanent
revolution”, the SDP (under the influence of Eduard Bernstein)
advocated something like permanent reform – a perpetual tweaking of
the capitalist system known as "evolutionary socialism".
The ultimate betrayal came in 1918, with the execution of both
Liebknecht and Luxemburg by an SPD government, following a failed,
desperate bid to recreate October in Germany. Though (abortive)
revolution did come to Germany in 1918, it ultimately failed
on grounds of organization. The historic compromise between reform
and revolution was not to be recreated. As vanguardist Communist
Parties sprung up throughout Europe, the era of revolutionary socialism as a mass,
democratic movement was effectively over, dismantled from within, but
also later bloodily suppressed by the rise of fascism. Walter
Benjamin would later summarize the philosophical mistakes of the
German SDP:
There is nothing
which has corrupted the German working-class so much as the opinion
that they were swimming with the tide. Technical
developments counted to them as the course of the stream, which they
thought they were swimming in. From this, it was only a step to the
illusion that the factory-labor set forth by the path of
technological progress represented a political achievement.6
Benjamin’s point is simple: that by
worshipping technological progress, the German movement ended up
selling its soul to capitalist development, on the promise of
material improvement. The party thus became an integral part, not of
a new post-capitalist order, but of the capitalist order itself. In
this sense its fate was a foretaste of the fate of Europe’s many
postwar Socialist and Labour parties.
Marx would be disappointed to discover
that the specter haunting central and eastern Europe today is not
Communism in any positive sense, but the terrifying legacy of
so-called Marxist parties, the primary symbol of which was his own
image. This familiar bearded colossus is conspicuous today by its
absence. While in London it is perfectly respectable to visit this
eminent Victorian doctor’s tomb (if a bit macabre), the stern,
hairy caricature of communist propaganda is nowhere to be seen behind
the former Iron Curtain. Less than contempt, his name elicits a sort
of condescension. There is a vague sense of disbelief that someone
could still find it worth mentioning him. He is a specter, then, in
the sense of being completely invisible, and yet felt
everywhere – so, in fact, a poltergeist.
If Marx is one of history’s great
intellectual victims – cast onto the famous “scrap heap” of
which he wrote – he cannot be entirely excused of blame. Marx never
solved the many programmatic confusions which underlay his theory of
class struggle. This was in part because those confusions were
constitutive – without them the theory couldn’t have
functioned. Constitutive theoretical confusions are what Marx liked
to call contradictions, and for him they were always, in some
way, productive. Contradictions were what allowed innovation and
change. So it may have been that Marx didn’t want to solve his
contradictions; or it might be that he simply couldn’t.
In the Communist Manifesto Marx
and Engels imagined an incipient world divided between two
revolutionary classes – the proletariat and the bourgeoisie – who
would align all other classes around them in preparation for a final
struggle over the future course and form of the social order itself.
The conviction that the proletariat would liberate first itself and
then the rest of society was, according to the Polish sociologist
Leszek Koloakowski, “a philosophical deduction rather than a
product of observation.”7
This impression remained an important influence even on Marx’s late
economic works. In Marx’s economic theory, the proletariat is not
only vital for capital but also a perpetual problem for it. The
production process, where goods are made, adds value to objects,
which the capitalist can later appropriate as profit, but even this
apparently simple act of accumulation is fraught with danger.
In the Grundrisse Marx observes
how, “As long as it remains in the production
process [capital] is not capable of circulating; and it is virtually
devalued.”8
The same applies vice versa
in the case of circulation – in circulation (when money moves
freely through the market) capital cannot produce the surplus value
that comes from labour, which is subsequently appropriated by
capitalists. In contrast to
its rather dour, earth-bound behaviour in Volume I of Capital
(where it is often embodied in
the ghoulish, Dickensian villain Mr Moneybags), in the Grundrisse
Marx creates an image of capital
far closer to how he really saw it: as a kind of wildly
creative, but also dangerous expansive, force - one prone, crucially,
to bouts of petulant financialisation. Here Marx’s more
vivid descriptions create the impression of an addict repeatedly
forced to return for more. Every hit must be bigger than the last,
just to keep the system going. It is, unsurprisingly, labour – as
the uniquely variable element within the capitalist system – that
creates this effect on capital. Capital therefore endlessly seeks to
reduce production time, as the whole time capital is engaged
in production (in the form of industry, tools, wage payments and so
on) it cannot realize its value (which is to say, capitalists can’t
get their hands on it). Yet when it escapes into circulation it
cannot create any new value (as this comes, largely, from labour
inputs). Labour, and the production process more generally, therefore
has a unique importance for Marx’s economic theory. The early
belief in a secret power attributable to the new industrial working
classes is thus reproduced in the mature economic theory. So unstable
would the capitalist system eventually become that the proletariat
would inevitably seize power.
This profoundly political view of
economic theory – perhaps the only attempt ever to totally
systematize the social order in view of its inevitable dissolution–
throws up all sorts of problems for those wishing to achieve the
political victories it promises. By ideologically binding his economics with a political theory in this way, Marx was effectively trying to overcome
the increasing distinction between politics – which was
becoming increasingly democratic and participatory – and economics
– which was becoming increasingly rationalized and administered by
experts (the “dismal science”) more generally. The fact the theory combines
political voluntarism - in the form of the organised working class -
and economic determinism - in the form of the inevitable decline of
capitalist vitality - could not be avoided by those addressing themselves to his legacy.
Marx ultimately imagined a
“co-operative society based on common ownership of the means of
production” – which is to say, a world in which democratic
institutions extended into the sphere of production in such a way as
to make the process itself democratic. This very abstract picture of
industrial, as well as social, democracy says nothing about how such
a situation is to be achieved. Indeed, beyond conceding that, during
the earliest phases of communist society certain defects will
inevitably arise, owing to the fact “it has just emerged after
prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society,” Marx gives few
clues as to how to tackle these problems.
While the “prolonged birth pangs”
envisioned by Marx would be given historical content by both Rosa
Luxemburg and Lenin as the crisis of imperialism and the consequent First World
War, the “defects” Marx had in mind were actually of the
extension of typically bourgeois legal norms beyond the socialist
horizon. The real “defects” which arose in the Communist movement
throughout eastern and central Europe, following the First World War,
owed little to bourgeois right, and much more to old-style Jacobin
tactics of revolutionary terror. What in effect gave such terrifying
leeway to the supporters of terror, coercion, suppression and mass
killing within the Marxist tradition was the political failure of the
earlier democratic, participatory efforts. Those efforts were
extinguished in Germany by a combination of war, nationalism, and
fascism, but also by the cowardice of the party leaders themselves.
At a more theoretical level, however, the weakness of the mass
parties stemmed from their inability to convincingly synthesize
revolution and reform into a single political practice.
Walter Benjamin would later write of the relationship between modernity and barbarism: "There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism."9 Benjamin’s insight is that political phenomena like fascism are not throwbacks to a time of savagery, but actually products of the historical currents of modernity. Against the commonly held prejudice that Marxism is simply a progressive creed supported by a mechanistic, determinist view of history, Benjamin enlists the “tradition of the oppressed” in the service of a “conception of history” that rejects classical notions of progress as dialectically bound up with barbarism. In this view, it is modernity itself which gives rise to the potential for fascism.
Walter Benjamin would later write of the relationship between modernity and barbarism: "There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism."9 Benjamin’s insight is that political phenomena like fascism are not throwbacks to a time of savagery, but actually products of the historical currents of modernity. Against the commonly held prejudice that Marxism is simply a progressive creed supported by a mechanistic, determinist view of history, Benjamin enlists the “tradition of the oppressed” in the service of a “conception of history” that rejects classical notions of progress as dialectically bound up with barbarism. In this view, it is modernity itself which gives rise to the potential for fascism.
One might add that
the potential for political terror is also bound up with the
political projects of modernity. As romantic conservatives so often
complain, there have been few modern revolutions which did not result
in some form of pan-social violence. Following the distancing of
mainstream Socialist parties from outright revolution, the Communist
vanguardists stepped in. The October Revolution and the conduct of
the Leninist Bolsheviks increasingly became the model for revolutionary
parties throughout Europe. By all accounts, most remained heavily
persecuted, and embryonic in their organisational capacities, right
up until the end of the Second World War. In Yugoslavia Tito's
Communist-dominated Partisans won broad appeal thanks to their
courage (ruthlessly exploited for anti-Chetnik propaganda purposes)
during the Nazi occupation. Throughout the rest of the Balkans -
Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria - the tiny Communist parties got their
only advantages over other, more nationalist parties, through
recourse to the Soviet Union. Only the Czechoslovak party, which
ironically benefited from being largely anti-German and grouped with
the other national 'majority' parties, broke with the rule by
commanding 30% of the popular vote. But as we have seen,
parliamentary majorities were increasingly eschewed following the
example of the Bolshevik revolution. This was not done wholly out of some
commitment to Marxist eschatology, but stemmed from Luxemburg's and
Lenin's belief that popular consent could be forged rapidly, through
extra-parliamentary means, during a period of revolutionary upheaval.
Legitimacy could thus be won through insurrection.
Though, of course,
none of the eastern and central European parties came to power in
their respective countries until after the Second World War, and then
only with the conspiratorial assistance of the Soviet Union, the
brutality of those Communist Parties cannot be put down to Stalinism
alone. The legacy of Leninist "democratic centralism" was
as crucial an organisational factor as any for the victorious
Communist Parties. Stalinism was a coercive, monstrous power of the
state. Leninism, on the other hand, was always more Machiavellian in
the sense of providing instruction on exactly how to win
and consolidate
possession of the state. Lenin once quoted Napoleon to illuminating,
if self-aggrandizing, effect:
Napoleon
wrote: “On
s’ engage et puis .
. . on
voit” Rendered
freely this means: “First engage in a serious battle and then see
what happens.” Well, we did first engage in a serious battle in
October 1917, and then saw such details of development (from the
standpoint of world history they were certainly details) as the Brest
Peace, the New Economic Policy, and so forth.11
Lenin's strategy, when translated into
the language of the Hollywood western, amounts to: 'Shoot first, ask
questions later.' As high summer turned to autumn in the year 1917
Lenin unceremoniously ditched his earlier clarion call - "All
power to the soviets" - in favour of centralized,
extra-parliamentary, Party-led agitation. The stirring, if ill-starred, call for immediate industrial democracy of that earlier slogan, had
to be replaced as normal life crept increasingly back into the
battle-worn Empire. The continued cardiac arrest of the state - or
the refusal to let the liberal and socialist majority get on with
their parliamentary business - was of paramount strategic importance
for the Bolsheviks. This tactical consideration was also at the heart
of Trotsky's great contribution to socialist revolutionary practice -
the so-called "permanent revolution", or the forcing of a
wider social revolution immediately after a bourgeois, political one.
This peculiar adaptability, a readiness to utilize whatever practical
expedient one has, attests not only to the political genius of both
Lenin and Trotsky, but also the remarkable adaptability of Marxism as
a political doctrine.
Fredric Jameson describes, in his
recent book on Marx's Capital, Marx as the inheritor of a peculiar philosophical tradition of
action, extending
through Aristotle, Machiavelli and Hegel. It was this privileging of
action - of the valuing of the material over transcendent laws -
which allowed Marx to develop such a complex, rewarding view of the
tendencies of capital, and also of the behaviour of political actors
within capitalism. On the other hand, this same practicality came
into conflict with other, more determinist, rationalist tendencies
within Marxism. In their political expressions - in the form of
reformist parliamentarism and vanguardist revolutionary agitation and
eventually terror - both tendencies of Marxism were ultimately
failures. While revolutionary Communism was more spectacularly
disastrous, the death of radical Social Democracy has been a quieter,
but no less absolute, tragedy.
1Referred
to here by its Anglicized acronym. In German it reads: SPD -
Sozialdemokratische
Partei Deutschlands
2
Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme, text
available free here:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ch01.htm
3
Luxemburg, ‘Reform or Revolution’, text
available: http://www.colby.edu/~jpgordon/LuxemburgReadings.pdf
4
Luxemburg, ‘The Mass Strike’, 163
6Benjamin,
Theses on the Philosophy of History,
text available at:
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/benjamin/1940/history.htm
8Grundrisse.,
621
9Benjamin,
Theses on the Philosophy of History
10Benjamin,
Theses on the Philosophy of History
11Lenin,
qtd. Lenin: A Study on the Unity of his Thought, Lukacs.
Text available here:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/1924/lenin/ch06.htm
I think that any revolutionary potential on the part of German Social Democracy is rather exaggerated. Revolution was rejected as a viable political strategy quite clearly from the late 1880's onward, and the importance of parliamentarism was never questioned except by the far left of the SPD. The predominant influence in terms of actual political practice rather than high ideology was that of Ferdinand Lasalle, that is the SPD embarked on a quest to find a place in the imperial system for the working class and to secure gradual improvements in working conditions, wages, and welfare provision. Even the orthodox Marxists in the pre-war SPD, such as Bebel and Kautsky regarded revolution as an unnecessary inconvenience: power would be delivered to the working class on a silver platter due to the internal contradictions of capitalism. This was set out in the Erfurt programme which you cite at the beginning of this post. Thus revolution was implicitly rejected as a path to power from very early on in the SPD's life. I do not think that Rosa Luxemburg was that important an ideological influence on the SPD even during her lifetime. After Kautsky the most important theoretician was Rudolf Hilfverding who elaborated Kautsky's position of the inevitability of a socialist society without any need for revolution by interpreting the cartelization and concentration of German heavy industry as a process that would in time facilitate central planning and social ownership. If one then skips the first world war and examines what the SPD did as the predominant pro-republic party in the Weirmar period, one would be hard-pressed to distinguish between its policies and and those of the Labour party of Ramsay MacDonald. Both accepted the prevailing dispensation despite some significant achievements by the SPD in the form of the 8-hour day, union consultation in the management of firms and of course the liberal if imperfect Weimar constitution itself.
ReplyDeleteAll appreciated. Perhaps the explicitly 'revolutionary' platform of the SPD was overstated. Without getting into the finer points of its history, I wanted to emphasise the movement's popular character along with Luxemburg's attempt to reconcile parliamentarism with revolutionary activity. The working synthesis of reform and revolution, its fleeting character duly acknowledged, was attributed to her not the Party per se. It was also accepted that the Party's official Marxist ideology masked a variety of often contradictory impulses within it. It's undeniable, however, that revolutionary elements coexisted alongside reformist ones (even if the latter constituted a majority). The central point holds weight: that the success of revolutionary, anti-democratic vanguardism was - partly - made possible by the destruction of popular movements. This is not to celebrate one at the expense of the other, only to point to a deep theoretical and practical problem for socialist politics. This is conceived as an inheritance from Marx himself. The prevalence of the view that 'cartelization' within capitalism would lead eventually, through the contradictions it engendered, to a socialist mode of production was not dealt with. Its emergence - among non-Marxist thinkers (e.g. Schumpeter)and Marxists (Kautsky et al.) - can, I think, be traced back to developments within the post-unification German economy. Of which more coming up...
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