The British state has a debt problem
and this makes rejecting austerity all the more important. The
conjunction between the two statements here is by no means
contradictory. It is customary on the left to deny the fiscal crisis
of the state, but there are real limitations to its capacity to
sustain social expenditure given the pronounced power of capital. The
march against austerity in London today might be the first step to
concretising the belief that much more needs to be done than
establishing popular support for the state in its current form.
Across the advanced economies of the
capitalist world deep public indebtedness has become the norm (rising
sovereign debt characterises the thirteen advanced economies in this
IMF paper). What is the result of rising public indebtedness?
Almost always the response of the capitalist state to fiscal strain
is contraction. The result, in turn, of that contraction, is further
unbinding of the already frayed tethers of social solidarity between
groups in capitalist society.
What does it really mean to talk about
a fiscal crisis of the capitalist state? In the abstract it means
very little. We need to be more specific: which capitalist state, at
which level of indebtedness, and in which period of historical
development? We can loosely measure these changes by looking at the
institutions of both the state and what is commonly called "civil
society." Since the 1970s the political economies and societies
of the advanced capitalist west - although especially the USA and
Europe - have undergone astonishing changes. At every level the
embededness of capitalism in domestic economies has been eroded, as
capitalist firms have become increasingly willing to internationalise
their activities. At the same time the various mediating institutions
between capital and labour have seen their influence either shrink to
a core (as in Germany) or become downgraded altogether (as in the
Anglo-Saxon economies of the USA and the UK). This has necessitated a
change in priorities for trade unions and works councils, from a
macro, sectoral focus to a micro, firm-level focus of collective
bargaining and worker protection. Precariousness and
peripheralisation have become the norm outside of key sectors.
Additionally, and crucially, the states of these countries have
struggled to keep their social commitments, coming under increasing
pressure to lower taxes, whilst at the same time having to shield
populations from the ravages of growing unemployment and redundancy.
Inevitably, given the balance of social and political representation
in the state, it is social commitments that are downgraded. These
long-term, secular developments are co-determining. As the
influential sociologist Wolfgang Streeck argues1,
there is no single class or sectoral driver to these changes. These
processes are driven, of course, by the social actors of capitalism,
but they are mutually reinforcing and equally unbalancing.
It follows from Streeck's argument that
rising public indebtedness is a symptom of the steady decline of
government tax intake and the growing instability of employment in
contemporary advanced economies. Moreover, as the economist James
Galbraith argues2,
there may be no return to high growth, which would increase
employment despite the fiscal binds on the state, because of resource
cost volatility, financialisation and the exhaustion of the
technological and productivity-increasing means of job creation. We
may now be living
in a low-growth world, where what little growth there is does not
fuel job creation on anywhere near the necessary scale.
This paints a very bleak picture for
the Keynesian prescriptions that are the common alternative to fiscal
contraction - in other words, austerity - and labour market
liberalisation. Keynes's argument was one based on psychological
assumptions very different to those of classical and neoclassical
economists. He described how the proportion of income not given over
to consumption would become savings and was in aggregate identical to
investment. This was the key to continuing growth in employment, the
conclusion being that a shortfall in demand - in the form of goods
for consumption and new investment - could prevent growth in
employment. Economies could stagnate - and unemployment remain above
its potentially lowest point - because of an absence of demand.3
By stimulating demand - primarily in the form of deficit spending,
but also tax cuts and lowering interest rates - the government could
create new employment, growing income/output, and therefore economic
growth. In theory it remains possible for the state to do this (after
all, there are no absolute limits to capitalism only relative
ones). The argument against a purely Keynesian policy program is the
institutional, social and political context. Even if the
institutional capacity for a Keynesian revival led by the state
exists (as perhaps it may in the United States), the kind of
technological take-up characteristic of the ensuing boom would not
necessarily drive job creation. Service economies, no matter how
high-tech, do not produce the same kind of mass employment as heavy
industrial economies. Moreover, with ongoing financialisation of
capital and the internationalisation of regulatory structures
(including the US state and its many free trade agreements, the EU
and its many treaties, the IMF and so on), it is not at all clear
that the reduced power of national governments could sustain a
reverse course for very long. This argument applies especially to the
UK with its heavy
reliance on financial services, its low
productivity growth, its high
degree of de-industrialisation, and the
pronounced weaknesses of the tax system.
None of this proves the fiscal
moralising of the deficit hawks right, however. The
theory of contractionary expansion has long been proved a delusion,
if it really ever held intellectual water. Keynesian stimulus can be
part of a broader alternative to austerity - but it cannot be the
only pillar, since it relies somewhat narrowly on the short-term
psychological expectations of investors and the underlying belief
that any animated "animal spirits" can generate the right
kind of growth. The Keynesian policy toolkit is just that - a set of
instruments which needs to be put to the right political uses.
What, if not growth alone, would amount
to an adequate challenge to austerity? Only a concerted effort of the
social will can begin - slowly - to reverse the decades-long
evolution of advanced capitalism. Because these secular tendencies
are multi-layered, only a multi-faceted effort - working at every
institutional level of the state and civil society - can begin this
work. Society does not have infinite resources for this task, and
defeat is a possibility if not quite a likelihood. However, it is
vital that we use our efforts to build concrete institutional powers.
Protest is a high-visibility response, but it can sometimes leave no
lasting trace. Our presence needs to be felt in institutions -
primarily the staid "core" union structure, as well as in
the new "peripheral" unions that seek to protect the more
precarious sectors of the economy. Struggles need to be built around
housing and immigration; urban destruction and resource exploitation;
feminism and minority rights. It is a tall order, but happily this
multi-faceted opposition - stretching well beyond the state -
reflects already the political logic of austerity capital, which
outsources "creative destruction" onto the different levels
of the social fabric.
We cannot win by opposition to cuts
alone - since that leads to a tunnel-vision focus on state power and
the Keynesian alternative to austerity. Instead, opposition to
austerity capitalism and what Streeck calls the "consolidation
state" must stretch across society, identifying its own causes -
anti-racism, feminism, social solidarity - with the continued
existence of the very fabric of society. At present capitalism and
the capitalist state are wrecking society. The opposition must, in
the end, seek to hegemonise society and direct it against the power
of capital.
1See:
Streeck, Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in the
German Political Economy (2010).
In the German case he says: "The
liberalisation of the postwar German political economy was not an
act of strategic institution-building governed by business in
alliance with a competition-conscious nation-state. Rather it took
place in a steady process of disorganisation... in the form of a
gradual decomposition... from below." (p.255)
2See:
Galbraith, James K., The End of Normal (2015)
He says: "There
will be no full recovery of demand. And even if there were, price
volatility in the resource markets and the development of yet more
labor- and capital-saving technology would soon choke it off."
( p.241)
3See:
Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(1936) where he argues: "The
mere existence of an insufficiency of effective demand may, and
often will, bring the increase of employment to a standstill before
a level of full employment has been reached." (Kindle Loc:
396-98)
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