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| British Prime Minister Theresa May: the latest Conservative politician to position herself in the "centre ground" (Photo credit: Policy Exchange via Flickr/Creative Commons) |
Cast your mind back a year: the
Conservative Party had won a majority in parliament for the first
time since 1992 and they were gearing up for a jubilant conference.
This new majority government would, the electorate was assured, reach
for the centre-ground of British politics. They would "steal
Labour's clothes" on policies like the national living wage.
They would pepper their firmness with fairness. The Shadow Chancellor
George Osborne was being hailed as a political genius even by his
left-wing critics. He had dispensed with stodgy, old fashioned
commitment to facts, ascending instead to a stratospherical realm of
pure spectacle. Osborne went beyond even Blairite spinners of yore,
as Blairites had always implicitly conceded that reality was thing
that had to be spun. For Osborne the chief raw material was not cold
fact but whatever messaging popped into his head and seemed tof it
the moment. The Tory Party, and moreover the vast majority of the
British press, seemed more or less content with the happy accident of
a Tory majority. What few minor hiccups lay ahead could be gently
massaged as they bubbled up.
And then 2016 happened. It turned out
that many Tory manifesto pledges had been written with no intention
of them ever being enacted. The scale of the promised cuts to
government expenditure along with simultaneous tax cuts was
impracticable. Labour opposition and the first stirrings of internal
Tory descent put paid to Osborne's tax credit cuts. With no feasible
avenue left for his planned spending cuts, Osborne's spring budget
collapsed in days. Eurosceptic Ian Duncan Smith resigned from the
frontbench. The Prime Minister was implicated in a tax evasion
scandal. And then the Brexit vote - one manifesto pledge the
government could not dodge - ended the careers not just of the Prime
Minister and his Shadow Chancellor but practically the entire liberal
core of the leadership.
An unprecedented disaster for a
majority government unlike anything experienced since the Tories'
last tenure in full control during 1992's Black Wednesday. And yet
the government has survived, albeit in slightly mutated form. The
cabinet had shifted to the right. It is a little more authoritarian
than before but not much. It is certainly more eurosceptic. Its
anti-immigrant bullying is likely to be more pronounced. Perhaps it
will take a slightly more interventionist approach to the economy.
But all of these add just a shade or two of true blue to the
Cameron-Osborne universe. Theresa May's arrival as prime minister -
via a blatant party stitch-up - has been greeted with a cathartic
swell in popularity. The Conservative Party's long-nurtured
appearance of competence, self-assurance, and steely commitment to
weathering the storms of crisis have seen them reach undreamt of
polling heights. They have benefited amazingly from a crisis they
made.
What explains this startling success?
The Conservative Party's historical role as protector of the Union
(and in times past of the Empire) gives it considerable clout in
British society. The Conservatives are the favoured party of the
British state and are existentially bound up with its survival. Yet
because of the association of this most durable of parliamentary
forces with the task of maintaining the British state, left-wing
critics are sometimes tempted to treat the Conservatives as
"anti-theoretical" or "anti-intellectual." The
apparent pragmatism of Tory policy in achieving its stated goals
masks deeper political and moral values and often implicit
ontological assumptions. Amongst these is the belief that the
endurance of a particular state of affairs - say, the institutions of
this or that state - can be viewed as a good in and of itself. The
roots of this view can be traced to a profound moral and political
pessimism which has often dominated English philosophy: if human
nature is frail and reason an unreliable guide in a dangerous world,
those customs and habits of collective life which endure the passage
of time can serve as an always-imperfect shield. The Tory philosopher
David Hume called custom "the great guide of human life."
Tradition, custom, and the slow build up of institutions were the
English sceptic's response to French rationalism, with its violent
political factionalism. Democracy was, for Hume, an "enthusiastic"
extravagance. The worldview of modern Toryism was forged in a period
of arch-reaction, when convulsions across Europe led to the need for
a highly statised, pragmatic power politics able to defend people
from the violent outcomes of their own high ideals.
The endurance of high Toryism has some
relation to the great internal strength of British state institutions
and the tightly knit bloc of hegemonic interests which oversaw its
modernisation. The British state has endured largely undisturbed
since the English Revolution. And the Tory Party has always been
there for those seeking to deepen or entrench their representation
within it. The Tories have never been simply the "managerial
committee for the affairs of the Bourgeoisie," but indeed have
viewed their role as preserver and sometimes as developer of its
national institutions. This commitment to the state - to the Union of
the British Isles - is not pragmatic at all but rather intensely
moral. It is premised on philosophical assumptions about human nature
and the nature of social life. It therefore plays a role in
constructing the terrain of Tory politics and constraining its
capability for action. Thus, Disraeli's great move to enfranchise a
narrow section of the (male) working class in the Second Reform Act
of 1867 can be seen as a simple act of pragmatism. After all if the
Tories didn't do it, Gladstone's Liberals would. But it can also be
seen in the broader pattern of the Tories permitting the arrival of a
certain rising class strata into state representation. It is an
integral part of arch-Toryism to see itself as smoothly directing
social change to the state's long-term advantage. Disraeli may have
lost the 1868 election but he secured a not-insignificant fraction of
working-class support for Toryism for a long time to come.
The inheritors of this legacy are,
however, nowhere to be found among the Party's recent leading lights.
The Tories have become victims of their own success. In the 1980s
Margaret Thatcher led a rapid and highly effective counter-revolution
against British state "corporatism" - one stubbornly
resisted by old school Tory elites. The latter resisted for what
turned out to be good historical reasons: the complete transformation
of British state functions actually eroded the old Tory levers of
power and influence over society. After the departure of Thatcher
herself the Conservative Party entered over a decade of crisis, one
which resulted in the marginalisation of the old Tory elite and the
emergence of a comfortably neoliberal, socially open-minded, free
market, small-state, low tax grouping as the new rulers of the party.
But the Cameroons, as they were dubbed, operated a weightless
hegemony over a party whose internal traditions had been worn
threadbare by the neoliberal onslaught on the British state. For a
party so thoroughly imbricated in the traditional functioning of the
British state, the upheaval of neoliberalism was bound to be
problematic.
Here's where the story returns to
George Osborne. If postmodernism is the cultural logic of late
capitalism, neoliberalism is its political and managerial ideology.
George Osborne was supposed to be the political master of both. But
in the end the very victories of neoliberalism, those which had
brought the likes of Osborne and his predecessor Tony Blair to power,
had simultaneously undermined the internal consistency, the raison
d'etre, the morale and the actual capacities of the British state.
The unintended result of the victory of neoliberalism over the
British state and the national economy can be read off in a long
list: the financialisation of all the major actors in the economy;
the internationalisation of production; the growing dependence on
credit to finance consumption; the eternal growth of trade and
current account deficits; the race to the bottom on wages and
welfare; the decline in productivity and the rise of shit, low-paid
jobs; the stagnation or decline in public spending on crucial public
goods and state-backed investment; the collapse in unionisation; the
collapse of political participation; the retreat of political parties
from communities and active social life; the concentration of wealth
in ever fewer hands in the south of England; the fraying of the
tethers of social solidarity between British regions and countries.
This decay of institutions resulted in a series of slow crises and
sudden catastrophes for British elites and for the Union itself: the
Iraq War, the 2008 financial crisis, the erosion of the two-party
system, the collapse of public trust in the state, the near-miss of
the Scottish referendum, the bull's eye of Brexit.
Why are the Tories electorally
invincible? Among the many factors why, the key is the survival
instinct of the social groups who are emotionally, ideologically, and
materially integrated into the British state. The Tory Party today is
fixed rigidly to this ever decreasing patch of earth, fending off
multiple threats to a decreasing pool of wealthy and moderately well
off voters. It is not Tory health that has made them victorious but -
paradoxically - the long-term ill-health of the system they are
pledged and trusted to defend. Those in the media currently
celebrating the revival in Tory electoral fortunes need only look at
the long-term trends or remind themselves of the events of the last
year. Many of those who work in the media along with much of the
higher-paid salariat are genetically predisposed to the political
centre. But just as they got the last year so wrong, they are wrong
again now. Because what they forget is that reality can always come
back to bite you, no matter how sensible, centrist and serious your
government appears. Another implosion is surely on the way.

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