In the midst of the Coronavirus crisis,
the British government has announced plans to subsidise 80 percent of
the salaries of workers in firms threatened with closure. If British
lobby journalists are to be believed, the government has just
'nationalised' the entire private sector. Except it hasn't. What it
has done is offer an effective subsidy to private firms to continue
paying wages. Crisis capitalism is no stranger to subsidies: you can
think of Quantitative Easing (whereby a central bank buys up debt
held by private sector financial firms in order to provide them with
cash) as a kind of subsidy. Since 2008 capitalism has become
increasingly reliant on these elaborately stylised subsidies, except
because they are done by central banks and have complicated names we
don't think of them as such. Where this new intervention does differ
from the past – in Chancellor Rishi Sunak's words it's
'unprecedented' – is in the particular conditionality of the
subsidy (it has to go to workers rather than bosses) and is coming
direct from central government rather than from a delegated
'non-political' authority like a central bank. For the first time in
the Coronavirus crisis, the government has broken a taboo of
neoliberal orthodoxy: central government – the Treasury in
particular – is going to spend a lot of money to keep people in
work. That said, the full coercive power of the law will not be
brought to bear on firms, as it remains an essentially voluntary
arrangement. Workers will likely have to push for firms to adopt it.
The policy comes later than other
countries, far beyond the point at which a full-scale health and
economic crisis could be avoided, and its very necessity points to
underlying weaknesses in the British model of capitalism. The absence
of trade union-negotiated employer commitments and a threadbare
social safety net has meant that few automatic
stabilisers now kick in in a crisis. The British economy is
built on a deregulated labour market and the ease with which workers
are 'hired and fired' is responsible not only for the Tories' 'jobs
miracle' but also the growth of a precarious sector which is extremely
vulnerable in a downturn. A common facet of advanced capitalist
economies today is a protected core workforce (with full-time hours,
protected contracts, and trade union representation) accompanied by a
growing peripheral precariat. The peculiarity of British capitalism
is that the core workforce is vulnerable to lay-offs, while the
precariat is even worse off.
Labour Shadow Chancellor John
McDonnell's plan for the government to cover up to 90 percent of salaries, whilst also taking a range of steps to ensure the
welfare of the newly unemployed, the self-employed (who will
effectively become unemployed during the shutdown), and the sick
would have been far more effective, but was always a pipe dream with
this Conservative government. McDonnell's plan made a specific commitment to raise sick pay and unemployment compensation up to the level of the real living wage. No such provision has been made in the actual announcements. The TUC has trumpeted its involvement
in this undoubtedly positive outcome for some workers, but
typically for today's unions, they covered a privileged layer of workers but failed
to fight for the most vulnerable. As the the Prime Minister promised
that restaurants could convert themselves into takeaways during the
closures, it is worth remembering that the likely delivery drivers
enabling these services will be precariously employed gig economy
workers for platforms like Deliveroo. There was precious little for
them in the announcements. In essence these measures enable just
enough social reproduction (that is, the basic stuff of everyday
life) to keep the reproduction of capital going.
So what do the measures achieve?
Firstly, the government has offered grants to all employers of any
size that cover 80 percent of each worker's wage. If the offer is
widely taken up, it will keep people in work. It violates a common
assumption in market societies that workers kept on the payroll
despite their underlying redundancy is a dangerous inefficiency. It
distorts what are supposed to be the basic tenets of a market economy
and as such could only be tolerated in the most extreme of
situations. That is an indicator of how bad things are. In context the new wage subsidy is wholly necessary to avoid an immediate social catastrophe. Next, there
are more measures for business including postponed tax payments and
more loans that follow the £330 billion announced a few days ago. Then, there is a volley of measures that cover Universal
Credit claimants (an extra £1,000 a year on the basic rate),
private-sector renters (covering 30% of local market rents), and the
self-employed (removing the minimum income threshold on Universal
Credit so that self-employed people can access an equivalent to
statutory sick pay). What it does not do is provide further certainty
for renters beyond the suspension of payments previously announced,
nor does it increase sick pay or reduce the five-week Universal
Credit waiting time. Together, these measures direct low-paid
renters, the self-employed, the unemployed and the sick towards the
bureaucratic, punitive and underfunded benefits system. For these
people, the benefits system remains below its 2010 level of
provision, while also being harder to access. This is potentially
disastrous because the people who need support most will have to jump
through hoops to get it. As Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn said in the
Commons this week, in this crisis, the health of all of us is
dependent on the health of the most vulnerable.
It is worth putting the scale of these
measures in their proper context. The Conservatives are responsible
for a shredding of the benefits system that was supposed to be in
place in times of crisis. They have also presided over ten years of
real-terms cuts to the NHS, which now threatens to collapse in the
wake of unprecedented demand for ICUs. A deregulated labour market –
championed by both Labour and Conservative governments alike – has
reduced workplace protections and made jobs much more vulnerable in a
crash. Restrictive trade union laws implemented by successive
governments since Thatcher have reduced workers' bargaining power.
Perhaps most pertinent – but least remarked upon – is the growth
of private-sector debt and the entanglement of non-financial
corporate firms in the growth of financial markets – especially since
2008. In this crisis we have not yet seen any banks collapse, despite
the nosediving stock markets, the ructions in short-term lending
markets, and the fleeing of investors towards cash and highly liquid
assets. This is partly because monetary institutions have an existing
arsenal of weapons – rates cuts, repo and commercial paper market
interventions, Quantitative Easing and dollar swap lines – by which
cash can be pumped into markets and debt payments and other bills can continue to be covered.
But banks are also in a relatively healthier state because the riskiest fringes of the securitised mortgage market have disappeared. The real threat
comes from heavily indebted corporate firms, which for years have
failed to make investments in productivity-enhancing technology, training the labour force, or in increasing wages. Households are also doing badly: remember that it is productivity that allows wages to sustainably rise and in a low productivity, labour intensive economy, returns to labour stagnate while retained earning go to the bosses. Stagnating earnings have led households to take on debt (credit has remained plentiful, as anyone with a credit card will tell you), in order to fund lifestyles dependent on globalised consumption. Instead, the
flood of cheap money rolling in from central bank interventions and
low interest rates has enabled them to borrow extensively. But even
for relatively well-performing firms, markets are fundamentally
future-oriented. As the scale of scheduled debt repayments grows
relative to forecasted future income, firms can face insurmountable
solvency issues. The Coronavirus crisis – which has buckled the
labour supply and crushed consumer demand – has radically curtailed
expected future earnings. This along with the heavy burden of debt is
what threatens a complete corporate meltdown. To be clear, no country
in the world is going to survive this crisis unscathed. Few are as
ill prepared for it as the UK.
What comes next may be equally as mould
breaking. Because supply lines in contemporary capitalism are global
and production is generally low on inventories, disruptions can cause
rapid collapses in output. As Coronavirus spreads, we are likely to
see production in many industries cease. Food production – which
remains labour intensive and therefore equally vulnerable to a
pandemic – could also suffer. So far the empty supermarket shelves
have been the result of spiking demand as panic-buying increases. We
could soon see supply-side shortages as global supply chains are
interrupted. The challenge for the government will be to maintain
food supplies by substituting domestic production for imports
(ironically, such import substitution strategies were once staples of
Third World economies and were much frowned upon by the leading
lights of global capitalism). Another interesting question is the
energy supply, where a major outbreak threatens staffing. Finally,
and most crucially, is the rate of infection among health service
workers. In each of these areas, the government may have to introduce
advanced safety measures to protect their respective workforces from
viral contagion. If the outbreak is very severe, the state will have
to take an almost militarised, commanding role over key economic
sectors. All of this assumes the worst, but it is the government's
job to plan for such eventualities. For a democratic socialist like
me, the prospect of state-command capitalism is not a delightful one.
Violent, suppressive measures – especially in border enforcement
and in the prison system – are a likelihood. Tory governments may
relish the latter, but they do not usually seek to take such a
directive role over the pillars of economic production. The next few
months could see the government forced to take up a much more
interventionist role than its current wage subsidy policy does.
The incompetence of the government in the early weeks of the outbreak has been widely under-reported, perhaps because of a reluctance of major journalists to look like they are scaremongering. The government's weak 'advice' for people to stay away from others has been fundamentally undermined by delays to the wage subsidy announcement. They may deny it ever existed now, but the early strategy of creating 'herd immunity' (maximising the spread of the infection while not disrupting normal economic activity) undoubtedly helped contribute to the impending disaster. This does not inspire much faith in its ability to rationally plan and organise the kinds of economic interventions that may soon become necessary. Something that has characterised the last forty years of capitalist state development is a general reduction in its capacity to take outright directive actions. The era of outsourcing investment to the private sector and delegating regulation to 'depoliticised' institutions has created a vast but hollow state structure. There is no guarantee that the government will be able to rapidly expand the state's capacity and expertise.
Finally, there is the question of how
to fund a growth in public expenditure in the middle of an economic
downturn. No government – Labour or Tory – would dare raise taxes
on such a weakened private sector. Instead the government will
increase public borrowing. In the last crisis yields on government
debt fell as investors sought a harbour in a storm. This time – at
least for the time being – investors are keener on hoarding cash –
dollars in particular – as the most liquid of all assets. Central
banks will have to commit to purchasing government debt – possibly,
in another violation of neoliberal lore – directly from governments
rather than in so-called secondary markets. Convincing central bank
intervention should bring down yields and stabilise prices, meaning
the state can borrow more for less. Panicked investors might seek to
flee the UK, leading to a crash in sterling (we have seen the pound
falling relative to the dollar this week). To combat this, the
government may need to break the foundational macroeconomic law of
neoliberalism and impose capital controls, compelling domestic investors to put their money into public debt.
Capitalism, then, but not as we know
it. Or at least, not as its propagandists have described it. In
truth, capitalism has been feeding off public subsidies ever since
2008. The jobs miracle of 2010-2019 can even be traced back to the
low interest rates and the flood of cash ploughed into the private
sector by central banks. In the coming year or two, the rules on the limits of
state involvement in the economy (particularly where fiscal policy,
state direction, and civil liberties are concerned) are going to be upended. The left can
make demands in this context, but it should not mistake what is
happening for a wholly progressive change. This is not a case of 'we're all socialists now'. Indeed, the government
will attempt to restore capitalist profitability by any means because
its legitimacy depends on the social function of profit. The left
should seek to use this crisis to make clear the underlying
iniquities driving it and for the expanded functions of the state to
take a more democratic and socially just form than they will under
the Conservatives.
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